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GRAND STRATEGY: FOREIGN 
AND DEFENSE POLICY IN 
A CHANGING WORLD1
Celso Amorim2
On January 2nd 2014, a bomb attack in Beirut wounded 60 people and 
took the lives of at least five of them, one of those being the Brazilian Malak 
Zahwe. The young Malak, who was born in Foz do Iguaçu, lived with her 
family in Lebanon and was shopping with her stepmother when the explosion 
occurred. A significant Lebanese community lives among us and a growing 
number of Brazilians in Lebanon. We have a close and direct link with that 
country. As the barbaric assault in January 2014 reminded us, this connection 
is, above all, a human link.
Tragic situations as that one reinforce the understanding of that we 
are part of a global society. The indifference to the challenges we face abroad is 
no longer tolerable. Isolationist attitudes such as “we should not involve our-
selves in matters that do not concern us” reveal not only insensitivity, but also 
a high lack of realism and misunderstanding. One effect of the much-vaunted 
globalization is that “all issues are ours.”
We have a clear interest in world peace and we must help preserve 
it. That was what Brazil tried to do, in some cases successfully and in others 
releasing seeds that would geminate later. We attracted Cuba to the Rio Group 
and to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). 
Today that country coexists peacefully with all nations of America. Together 
with Turkey we strived to reach a deal with Iran about their nuclear program, 
which demonstrated that there was ground for searching solutions to that 
thorny issue through dialogue. Today, in both cases, we congratulate the pro-
1  Paper partially based on a lecture delivered at the Escola de Guerra Naval on May 14, 2015.
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gress made by the greatest power in the world.
On another occasion, I stated that Brazil should not be satisfied with 
being a peaceful country, but should also seek to be a “peace provider” coun-
try. For this purpose, Brazil should adopt a grand strategy which combines for-
eign policy and defense policy. Naturally, diplomacy is the first line of defense 
of our interests. And dialogue should be its main instrument. But in a world 
where conflict is far from being extinct and the great powers often resort to 
unilateral actions, diplomacy must have the permanent support of defense 
policy.
Much is being said about soft power since Joseph Nye, a Harvard 
professor and a former US assistant secretary of defense, coined the term. It 
is an innovative concept that applies to many characteristics of Brazil and its 
people, its culture and its tradition of peace. But no country asserts itself in 
the world only by the attraction of its culture and habits. And there are situa-
tions, as we experienced during World War II, in which soft power itself is not 
enough to prevent attacks or incursions that could affect our sovereignty. So, 
at the same time we cultivate and exercise our soft power, we should strength-
en it. Our soft power, expressed in the ability of cooperating in a mutually ben-
eficial way with other countries, will be enhanced by our hard power, which 
is able to deter threats and turn the defense matters collaboration with our 
neighbours and partners (for example, the protection of natural resources) 
into reality.
The until now successful experience in Haiti, through which we con-
tributed to restore order in that country, gave back to Haitian people the ca-
pacity to decide about their destiny, and is also an example of the combination 
of soft power and hard power in a situation that wasn’t an immediate threat 
to our country. In Haiti there was a very real risk that a sister nation, with 
which we have many affinities - and that, after all, is not so far from us -, 
fell under control of armed gangs, a perverse combination of former military 
coup officers and drug dealers. It was because of Haiti that we coined (or we 
borrowed from the African Union, until now I am not certain about it) the 
concept of “non-indifference”. 
The presence of a frigate of Brazil’s Navy in the maritime component 
of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, is another illustra-
tion of how the use of military instruments may strengthen the diplomatic 
action in the pursuit of peace. In spite of the great difficulties that Lebanon 
is facing, we are sure that we are fulfilling our responsibility to this friendly 
nation. In addition, we reinforce with our military presence the assets for an 
eventual political and diplomatic action, when conditions in that region allow. 
One or two decades ago, the participation of a Brazilian warship in operations 
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in the Mediterranean Sea, one of the most traditional geopolitical chessboards 
of the world, would be seen as highly unlikely. Today, even the critics of Bra-
zil’s involvement in seemingly distant issues, such as the Middle East, do not 
seem to doubt the importance of our contribution to UNIFIL. This evolution 
is in a way related to the direct impact of the 2006 war between Israel and 
Lebanon, when seven Brazilian died and three thousand compatriots were 
evacuated by air to Brazil in a coordinated operation by our Ministry of For-
eign Relations with the decisive support of our Air Force. I was in Beirut the 
day after the cease-fire and I could see with my eyes the eloquent proof of the 
proximity between the two peoples: t-shirts of the Brazilian team and flags of 
Brazil in the midst of the rubble and destruction caused by the Israeli bomb-
ing.
Our participation in Lebanon, as well as our diplomatic action in sit-
uations such as the one that led to the “Tehran Declaration” on Iran’s nuclear 
program, and also the invitation to participate in the Annapolis Conference on 
the conflict Israeli-Palestinian3 emphasize the importance of reflecting about 
our challenges and of defining our interests. We have to think about our role 
in the world without questions and autonomy. The conception of an authen-
tically Brazilian grand strategy – combining foreign policy and defense policy 
– will result from a wide public dialogue about our challenges and priorities, 
which involves political, diplomatic and military resources, with the partici-
pation of academy, media, productive sectors (employers and employees) and 
society in general. The publication in 2013 of the Defense White Paper and 
revised editions of the National Defense Policy and National Defense Strategy 
should be seen as part of this dialogue.
Much has been written about the fluid nature of international real-
ity. In the last years of the twentieth century, after the end of the Cold War, 
we went from bipolarity to a kind of “consented unipolarity”. Later, in the 
new millennium, the world has evolved into a mixed structure, which pre-
serves the characteristics of unipolarity at the same time that approaches to a 
multipolar world in some ways. At the same time, we watch arise in the hori-
zon a potentially new bipolarity, with China assuming, mutatis mutandi, the 
role of the old Soviet Union, without the ideologic fervor.  
We live in a time of fast and deep changes, marked also by ambiva-
lence. The emergence of new actors and the so-called “asymmetrical threats” 
often mentioned by defense and international relations scholars has not elim-
inated the former agents in the world order. And the conflict between the 
States has not disappeared from the horizon. Even in times of economic glo-
3  I talk about these two themes in two of the narratives of my most recent book “Tehran, Ram-
malah and Doha: memoirs of an active and proud foreign policy” (Benvirá, 2015).
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balization, nation-states still keep their importance and sovereignty remains 
a guiding principle. The “international community” was often used to justify 
actions that correspond to the interest of one or more of a great power. The 
“responsibility to protect”, as enshrined in UN resolutions, was invoked in 
situations where the real goal was “regime change” and not, as claimed, the 
“protection of civilians”. Multilateralism has not overcome the defense of na-
tional positions.
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, it took shape in the 
United States an extensive debate about the supposed decline of their relative 
position in the world. Four years ago, when I was at Harvard for a month, in 
a fellowship of the famous Kennedy School of Government, after leaving the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, I could attend many discussions and debates 
in which the relative decline (or not) of the United States was a central object 
for American scholars themselves. I was back to that institution in 2015 after 
leaving the Ministry of Defense and I verified that the axis of the discussion 
had changed. Today, more than multipolarity, it is the rise of China, its eco-
nomic influence and, above all, its maritime projection strategy that raise in-
terest and apprehension. More than any other one, the logic of national inter-
est determines the definition of positions. It is in this context that one should 
understand the stimulus for Japan to take over again a military and strategic 
role, which was abandoned after World War II.
In a world where ideologies lost importance in the definition of na-
tional policy, State coalitions, more than ever, reflect a variable geometry. De-
spite Washington’s efforts, governments of major European economies did 
not evade to participate in the Asian Development Bank, led by Beijing. The 
former group of seven major industrialized economies, the G7, has evolved 
into the G8, with the temporary incorporation of Russia (more in due to its 
nuclear status than to their economic relevance), and then to the G20, that 
has included emerging economies and that was defined by the President of 
the United States as having the primary role in economic and financial is-
sues. The recent resurgence of the G-7 does not change this picture. And in 
reality, it is a fact much less relevant than the increasing coordination among 
members of the BRICS. Some authors have come to find that, with the grad-
ual dissipation of the surplus power of the superpower, there would be given 
the conditions for a so-called “G-Zero”, in which nor the United States could 
lead and neither other countries be willing to follow. Fareed Zakaria, among 
others, drew attention to what he described as “the rise of the rest”4.
Whatever these “Gs” are, we now have a complex reality that does not 
4  Zakaria, Fareed. “The post-American world and the rise of the rest”. (Penguin Books, 2009).
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fit the models dictated by the “single thought”. There is a wide consensus that 
there would be an ongoing decentralization of power in the political, econom-
ic and cultural fields, and even (perhaps less) in scientific and technological 
fields. Multipolarity, even though imperfect, has raised hopes of a world more 
balanced and free from hegemonic powers. However, in the military field, 
unipolarity continues to prevail on a large scale. It suffices to recall that de-
fense spending in the United States exceeds the total military spending of all 
other countries. The advances of this country in areas such as cyber have no 
equivalent in other powers. 
Despite this superiority, varied psychological and social factors, es-
pecially the growing aversion to the deaths of fellow compatriot graphically 
transmitted by modern media, reduce the margins for the projection of mil-
itary power in other regions. If television has contributed in some way with 
their tragedy-filled images of napalm victims to hasten the end of the Vietnam 
War, one can imagine what could be done by the social networking, the twit-
ters, etc. in a similar situation nowadays. Therefore all the incessant search 
for means of destruction “without risk” or very low risk as the drones and the 
threats of cyber warfare. Even less advanced forms of low-risk attacks were ap-
plied, for instance, in military operations against Serbia in Kosovo, where the 
air strikes were carried out at high altitudes making it impossible the accurate 
discernment of targets. In both cases, the side effects on civilian populations 
increase considerably.
The exception to this aversion to risk exposure occurred only - and 
with the qualifications above - in situations when the safety of the American 
people itself was perceived as directly threatened, as happened on September 
11. Despite all the revulsion caused by the so-called “Islamic state”, the num-
ber of assorted air against ISIS or ISIL militants is infinitely smaller than 
what was verified in the Second Gulf War, which resulted in the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.
The usually shared assumption is that, in a “post-hegemonic world”, 
the international institutions created at the end of the Second War would be 
maintained.  With the probable overcoming of United States by China as the 
world’s greatest economy in the next decades, it would be convenient for the 
whole world and for the United States itself that Washington abandoned the 
logic of exceptionalism and adhered, more strictly, to the rules of multilateral 
institutions. The courageous initiatives of the Obama administration towards 
Iran and Cuba allow some optimism, despite the resistance of more conserv-
ative Americans sectors.
This would also bring benefits to other countries, ensuring some level 
of stability to the international relations. However, regarding the developing 
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nations, these benefits will only be full if the commitment to internation-
al norms is accompanied by effective reform of decision-making process of 
these institutions, starting with the UN Security Council. But in relation to 
this topic, the largest opposition seems to come not only from the still greater 
power - that keeps an ambivalent position about the enlargement - but also 
from other quarters, including China, our partner in the BRICS, what once 
again underlines the complexity of relations between States in the contempo-
rary world.
In a recent article, Kofi Annan and Gro Harlem Brundtland5 made 
a proposal for an interesting compromise: long term mandates, with indefi-
nitely long mandate members able for re-election. But even this mid solution 
seems difficult to adopt in the short and medium term, since it implies a 
reform of the San Francisco Charter, requiring the ratification of the eventual 
amendments by 2/3 of member states, including the so-called P5. A G-20 that 
started to mind also themes related to peace and international security – with 
no harm to UNSC’s detention of the last decision power – seems to offer the 
best hope of a greater degree of decentralization of international order, inject-
ing “fresh air” into discussions about these themes. 
Regarding the Middle East situation, at a certain point, the major pow-
ers seemed to understand the importance of a wider participation of countries 
from various regions, including developing nations. Washington’s invitation 
to Brazil, India and South Africa to participate in the Annapolis Conference 
in December 2007 illustrates this kind of understanding. It is evident that in-
formal arrangements such as the G-20 cannot replace the need for a reformed 
Security Council, which must remain a strategic goal for the Brazilian foreign 
policy, with consequences to the defense policy. The reform of the UNSC is 
necessarily part of the “Grand Strategy” of Brazil.
The authors that admit that there is a decline (absolute or relative) of 
US hegemony point out the contradictions involved. The political and military 
presence of the superpower in many conflicts and crises around the globe, 
which is a consequence of global hegemony logic that resulted from the end 
of the Cold War, may drain vital resources for investments in other areas such 
as the environment, health or education. A reduced involvement would imply 
reviewing compromises with many allies and, in general, disengagement of 
a series of operating theaters. Depending on the point of view, such an evolu-
tion can be seen as positive or negative, but it would have important implica-
tions for the international order.  
5  Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/opinion/kofi-annan-gro-harlem-brunt-
land-four-ideas-for-a-stronger-un.html?_r=0
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Published in the framework of the American debate, a common point 
to these theses is the recognition of a downward trend, discreet but noticea-
ble, of some of the asymmetries between the superpower and the other States. 
The assessment of some of these “declinist” theses could strengthen the per-
ception that the redistribution of global power is still an unpredictable range 
phenomenon. For now, it’s not possible to tell if the new post-unipolar order 
will be consolidated as a multipolarity, that is, a distribution of the world pow-
er between a certain number of States – or groups of States – in a relative 
balance, or whether, as exposed above, it will take the direction of a new bipo-
larity, this time between the United States and China.
Looking at the world from our point of view and, with the indispensa-
ble realism, it seems right to affirm that it will still persist for some time if not 
a unipolar reality, at least a unipolar mentality. The most worrying aspect of 
this mentality is that it is not purely descriptive or analytical, it brings together 
a prescriptive element such as “we have to accept reality and adapt to it”. In 
other words: according to this narrow vision, Brazil would have to continue to 
play a secondary role in the global scenario, submitting itself to the dominant 
power strategy and seeking, at most, to extract advantages from a subordinate 
association.
Equally dangerous is the correlation between hegemony and stability. 
In the “hegemonic” view, which prevailed in the immediate “post-Cold War”, 
stability would be guaranteed by a certain “benign domination”. As the past 
decade has demonstrated, the thesis that the hegemony generates stability 
is misleading. In the opposite direction to the superpower own interests, in-
cluding the expansion of terrorism, the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent 
destabilization of the precarious Middle East order are eloquent proof that 
hegemony leads to insecurity, not stability.
Thucydides, in his masterful narrative about the war between the 
Hellenic peoples, perfectly understood this point. At the beginning of the 
“History of the Peloponnesian War”, the Athenian historian explains that the 
origin of the conflict was because Sparta realized the excessive accumulation 
of power in Athens. In another part of the book, Thucydides makes an expla-
nation of transcendent importance about the subject and still valid today: “I 
do not blame those who wish to dominate, but those who surrender hastily. 
It is part of the nature of man to dominate those who surrender him, as it is 
to resist those who attack him”(IV, 61). These words aptly apply when seek-
ing to explain the opposition of several States to the attack on Iraq in 2003. 
Such opposition also reflected the concern for the integrity of the normative 
system of the United Nations Charter, which outlaws the use of force without 
the prior and explicit authorization of the Security Council (except in cases of 
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legitimate defense, a concept that should always be interpreted cautiously and 
narrowly)6.
Historical perspective sheds additional light on the reason why Brazil 
started to work tirelessly, from the beginning of the last decade, in order to 
stimulate the incipient multipolarity elements of the contemporary world. Not 
only from the angle of the principles, but even from the pragmatic perspec-
tive, unilateralism stimulated by the hegemony brought consequences con-
trary to those desired. The goal of multipolarity was sought by Brazil on sever-
al fronts, such as the high priority given to the integration of South America; 
the demand for the democratization of decision-making bodies of the United 
Nations; the search for more justice in trade negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization; and the articulation with new partners in the developing world, 
such as members of the IBSA and BRICS, but also with Arab and African 
countries. Needless to say, economic, cultural and human motivations were 
also present to varying degrees in these efforts. The multipolarity, based on 
multilaterally accepted norms, provides the most favorable conditions. The 
multipolarity, based on multilaterally accepted norms, provides the most fa-
vourable conditions for Brazil to define autonomously its interests and carry 
out a grand strategy that includes not only the dimension of a peaceful country, 
but of a peace provider country.
We are in a period of transition between the unipolar mentality, the 
risk of new bipolarity and the promise of multipolarity. It is against this back-
ground that it is necessary to examine the dynamic areas of some of the situa-
tions with potential for conflict in the current reality. One of these situations is 
the disputes over maritime territories rich in natural resources in Asia, where 
different States demand the extent of their jurisdictions on overlapping areas. 
We have witnessed a competition involving regional powers such as China, 
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and India, as well as extra-re-
gional powers such as the United States. Recent developments in these areas 
indicate, first, an effort by the US government to reorient its political-military 
engagement to the so-called “pivot to Asia”.
In an editorial, an important newspaper of the United States support-
ed the measures of the Japanese government toward a bigger flexibility in the 
use of military force and demanded the formation of an alliance of democra-
cies in Asia to counterbalance - in the words of the editorial - China’s rise. In 
Asia, the insufficiency of confidence-building, promotion of transparency and 
definition of common rules of conduct mechanisms is a ponderable fact in 
the analysis of the development of that region.
6  On the brink of the Second Gulf War, supporters of a military attack largely used the idea of 
preemptive self-defense, which is full of dangerous implications.
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Another area that is stage for major changes - not all in a positive 
sense - is the Middle East. The so-called “Arab Spring” raised high hopes 
that several countries would walk toward more democratic political systems 
with greater popular participation. But with the possible exception of Tunisia 
(and even this country is subjected to violent terrorist eruptions that put into 
question the government’s ability to face the attraction of fundamentalist doc-
trines), what could be seen was the degeneration of the democratic movement 
in factional conflicts, as in Syria, or the pure and simple retrocession toward 
authoritarianism, as in Egypt. 
In recent years, concerns emerged about the future of the territorial 
status quo created by the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and 
Great Britain, that predicted the end of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 
First War. It could be even positive if the routing of changes had occurred 
peacefully - which obviously is not the case. The famous phrase of Marx that 
“violence is the midwife of history” fully applies to the Middle East, but not 
in the direction of social and political progress, as advocated by the German 
thinker.
The possibility that the Middle East map ceases to exist as drawn 
about a century ago is seen more with apprehension than with hope. Some of 
the actions of the great powers contributed strongly to this evolution. Political 
support and the provision of weapons to rebellious factions fuelled funda-
mentalist sectors, just as, at the other extreme, military aid to authoritarian 
governments did not stimulate the search for solutions through dialogue.
On the other side of the scale, the recent agreement between the P5 
+ 1 and Iran creates a positive expectation for forwarding certain issues such 
as the future of Iraq and Syria (and the related issue of the so-called “Islamic 
State”), regardless of the fears, for different reasons, of some countries in the 
region such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.
In the Middle East, strategic factors are mixed up with interests on 
access to natural resources and emphasize ethnic or religious cleavages. Un-
til recently, Syria had been a microcosm of these tensions. Today it disputes 
this position with Iraq, not mentioning Yemen. The agreement sponsored by 
Russia and supported by the United States in September 2013, which foresees 
the destruction of Syrian chemical arsenal, was an encouraging sign of the 
opened space for diplomacy. Few people know that the special envoy of the 
Director of the Organisation for the Chemical Weapons Prohibition in this 
important mission is a Brazilian, Ambassador José Artur Denot Medeiros, 
who for five years was our representative at the OPCW.
In the case of Syria, it is common to hear the known (and correct) 
refrain that there is no military solution to the conflict. At the same time, 
Grand Strategy: foreign and defense policy in a changing world 
18 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.4, n.7, Jan./Jun. 2015 
the behavior of the great powers by arming one or other side of the civil war 
contrasts with this vaunted pacifist conviction. The destabilization caused in 
Libya and in the North Africa by the Anglo-French-American military inter-
vention against the Gaddafi regime in 2011 fits into the same scenario.
To the drama of the refugees is added the plight of immigrants. Al-
though external interference in the Syrian conflict has not reached similar 
proportions, it’s necessary to register that the conflagration in that country 
has spilled over into neighboring countries, as became clear in the bombing 
in Beirut that killed our compatriot Malak Zahwe.
The threat of an aggressive “Islamic state” goes from the Middle East 
to almost the Gulf of Guinea. Crises such as Syria’s require an attitude of re-
spect to the UN rules and of a joint work with all interested parties that may 
have influence the ongoing political process, including - in the case – Iran. 
What I want to denote is that, on the contrary to what we often see being de-
fended, foreign intervention is a remedy that usually attacks the patient, not 
the disease. The situation in Iraq post-2003 has been a sad demonstration of 
that, while the country is threatened by ethnic and religious conflicts and by 
the proliferation of terrorist groups.
A situation that highlights the growing fluidity in the contemporary 
international reality is comprised of vast spaces located beyond the national 
jurisdiction of sovereign States or in their limits, which is the case of the deep 
seas, the high latitudes and the outer space. These areas are not free from 
pretensions of hegemonic control (and I do not speak here of a single super-
power) at the expense of the rights of the coastal States or the rights of ex-
ploitation according multilateral rules of conduct. The opening of new routes 
and the exploration possibilities in the Arctic gave impetus to the discussion 
of the subject. An editorial of the Financial Times noted in the region that “for 
now, the struggle for resources remains polished. But it may not last, if the 
discoveries happen in advance of the game rules”. Obviously, this risk is not 
limited to the Arctic. It extends to all parts of the world where the competition 
for natural resources will tend to intensify, as the global demand increases. 
The South Atlantic, area of our interest, will not be free of it.
Cyberspace is another dimension in what is visible the engagement 
of the major powers with economic and military purposes. Because it is a 
recent phenomenon, the cyber warfare is still not fully known. However, it 
is questioned, in analogy to the prevailing conceptions at the time of World 
War I, if it is not being created a “cult of cyber offensive”. This impression is 
reinforced by initiatives such as the decision taken by a major country, the 
Great Britain, to develop offensive capabilities (not just defense) in the cyber 
field. The honest approach to the subject by that country’s Minister caused 
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wide repercussions. But certainly London is not the only capital to pursue 
this path. The case of the Stuxnet virus, that attacked Iran’s nuclear program, 
should be studied carefully, especially when you know the tendency in certain 
circles to extend the concept and scope of the non-proliferation to the “coun-
ter-proliferation”.
According to some experts, new war technologies like cybernetics, 
but also unmanned aerial vehicles, will erase the traditional distinctions be-
tween “war” and “peace,” “military” and “civilian”, “foreign” and “domestic” 
and “national” and “international”, with the potential to invert the logic of 
aversion to the risk that I mentioned before. More broadly, what is emerging 
on the horizon is the possibility that it will be set up a permanent state of bel-
ligerence between opponents countries, even more because the boundaries 
between espionage and war are not precisely defined. To David Rothkopf, ed-
itor of the Foreign Policy journal, it is a new kind of war that is called the Cool 
War, opposed to the Cold War. In the Cold War mutually assured destruction 
(significantly known as “MAD”, its acronym in English) by nuclear weapons 
prevented the superpowers to attack each other. In this new kind of war, a 
little ‘hotter’ than the last, each contender might be able to “attack constantly, 
without triggering an open war”. Countries such as Brazil cannot remain in-
different to the signs that these lines of thought may come to prevail.
The common denominator of the territorial tensions in Asia, the risks 
of fragmentation in the Middle East, the rivalry on the seabed and the mili-
tarization of cyberspace, among several other fluid areas of the international 
system, has the potential to spread globally, inevitably affecting Brazil and our 
strategic environment, beginning with South America and the South Atlan-
tic, in the sequence. Some of these elements of tension are naturally more 
distant from us, while others inspire more immediate care. However, all of 
them have systemic repercussions, and may be factors of vulnerability for the 
Brazilian and other South American countries’ interests, which collectively 
interests us to protect.
A reasonable balance of world power is a fundamental, though not 
sufficient, condition for the maintenance of peace. This is one of the pro-
posals of grand strategy of Brazil, combining soft power and hard power in 
order to provide peace. We must be adequately able to defend our territory, 
our people and our interests. The purpose of these and many other measures 
is to assure the Brazilian possession of means that can remove threats and 
aggressions that we can suffer at any time and originated in any framework.
To defend, deterrence is not enough. It’s necessary also to cooperate. 
This has been and must remain the basic principle of the defense policy in 
the Brazilian strategic environment. With the neighbors of South America, 
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we are deepening trust, transparency and a shared vision of Defense goals, 
bilaterally and through the Council of South-American Defense. The defense 
of South America is a responsibility of the South Americans. It is important 
the gradual consolidation of this view in the policies of all countries of our 
subcontinent. The recently created South American School of Defense (ES-
UDE in Portuguese), headquartered in Quito but acting in a decentralized 
form, is a major step to deepen and to extend the traditional cooperation that 
we already have with other South American nations. We should take this co-
operation to new areas such as industry and high-tech, as aerospace and cy-
bernetics (which has already begun to happen) as well as to countries that, in 
due to their incipient development, are more vulnerable to the interference of 
extra-regional interests. 
Also in the South Atlantic, it is noteworthy the cooperation we have 
provided to the formation of the Coast Guard and naval capacity of Cape Verde 
and the assistance that the Brazilian Navy is giving to the African Union, with 
regard to maritime safety. The Brazilian Navy, in a pioneering way, extended 
the cooperation with Namibia and has participated in the discussions and 
exercises related to the security of the Gulf of Guinea. And it’s not just for sol-
idarity, which is also relevant. It’s a direct interest of Brazil, considering that 
a great part of our trade with Africa passes through there, especially our oil 
supply. Through ZPCSA7, we unite efforts so that our ocean is a zone of peace 
and cooperation, free of nuclear weapons and all sorts of strange rivalries to 
our strategic environment.
The realistic understanding of Brazil’s defense needs in the world has 
distinguished precursors. It was with a great foresight that Rui Barbosa, in a 
piece of 1896, argued that “peace is the essential clause of our progress. But 
(…) the first condition for peace is respectability and the respectability of the 
force”. Or, in a current terminology: soft power must be supported by hard 
power.
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ABSTRACT
In the last years of the twentieth century, after the end of the Cold War, the world has 
evolved into a mixed structure, which preserves the characteristics of unipolarity at 
the same time that approaches to a multipolar world in some ways. In an internation-
al reality marked by its fluid nature, the emergence of new actors and the so-called 
“asymmetric threats” has not eliminated the former agents in the world order. And 
the conflict between the States has not disappeared from the horizon. In this con-
text, diplomacy must have the permanent support of defense policy. Therefore, in the 
Brazilian case, the paper presents that the country should adopt a grand strategy that 
combines foreign policy and defense policy, in which soft power will be enhanced by 
hard power.
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